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Abstract: Elliptic curves are fascinating mathematical objects. In this paper, we present the way
they have been represented inside the COQ system, and how we have proved that the classical
composition law on the points is internal and gives them a group structure. We then describe
how having elliptic curves inside a prover makes it possibleto derive a checker for proving the
primality of natural numbers.
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Prouver la primalité avec des courbes elliptiques
Résumé : Les courbes elliptiques sont des objets mathématiques fascinants. Dans ce travail,
nous présentons la façon dont elles ont été représentées dans le système COQ, et comment nous
avons prouvé le fait que la loi de composition classique est bien interne et munit l’ensemble
des points de la courbe d’une structure de groupe. Nous décrivons alors comment cela permet
d’obtenir un vérificateur permettant de prouver la primalité de nombres naturels.
Mots-clés : courbe elliptique, formalisation des mathématiques, preuves de primalité
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1 Introduction
Elliptic curves are a very classical topic of interest in number theory and algebraic geometry,
and the basis for a very large body of theory, with lots of far-fetched generalisations. Their most
famous application is, without any doubt, the proof of Fermat’s last theorem. They are also
commonly used in algorithmic number theory since the mid 80’s for factoring integers [15] or
proving primality [8], but have also made their way more recently in cryptography, see e.g. [5].
It is then natural to try formalising them inside a proof system. In this work, the main property
we are interested in is their group structure. The difficult part of the formalisation is in proving
associativity. In our formal proof, we follow an elementarylgebraic approach that is particularly
suited to proof systems. Our main source of inspiration has been the proof proposed by Stefan
Friedl [7]. The proof is very technical and consists in massaging equalities over an abstract field
under various conditions. The only sour point is that some ofthese equalities (exactly 3) are
so huge that they cannot be reasonably handled by a human being. In his paper, Stefan Friedl
advocates the use of a computer algebra like COCOA [4] to check these equalities. Reflecting
these computations inside the proof system is the main difficulty of the formal proof. In this
paper, we explain how this has been done inside the proof system COQ [22].
Once the group structure has been established, we can use elliptic curves in a very effective
way to prove the primality of some natural numbers. For this,we useprime certificates: vari-
ous primality proving algorithms provide the user with a compact output, acertificate, with the
property that it can be easily checked, whereas generating it s usually cpu-intensive.
We have already played with the idea of prime certificates andin particular of Pocklington
certificates in [9, 10]. This allows us to prove the primalityof some large numbers like the
millennium prime (a prime number with exactly 2000 digits dicovered by John Cosgrave) or
the27th Mersenne prime244497 − 1. The only drawback of the certificates we have been using
so far is that they only apply to a restricted class of prime numbers. For example, a Pocklington
certificate can be generated forN if N − 1 can be factored; in particular, we are not able to
generate a Pocklington certificate in the case where(N − 1)/2 turns out not to be prime (this
can be shown by compositeness tests) but it is impossible to fac r it, which is a typical case as
soon asN grows large. In contrast, under some deep (typically Crámer’s conjecture) conjectures
of analytic number theory, elliptic curve certificates exist for any prime and can be found in
polynomial time. At the moment, the largest prime for which an elliptic certificate has been
generated has 20562 decimal digits. Ten days are needed to verify its certificate [18].
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall what elliptic curves are and ex-
plain how their group structure has been formally established. In Section 3, we focus on prime
certificate and show how it is possible to formally derive a checker for elliptic curve certificates.
2 Elliptic curves and group structure
In algebraic geometry, an elliptic curve is defined as follows.
Definition. Let K be a commutative field. An elliptic curveE(K) is a pair(C, P ) whereC
is a (complete) algebraic curve of genus 1 defined overC andP a point ofC(K).
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This definition is not very tractable in practice, and the following characterization, which
follows easily from the Riemann-Roch Theorem [21], is rather used as a definition.
Proposition. Every elliptic curve overK admits an affine plane model of the form
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6, (1)
where the distinguished point of the definition is the projective point(0 : 1 : 0), i.e. the direction
y → ∞. If the characteristic ofK is greater than5, the equation further simplifies to
y2 = x3 + Ax + B. (2)
Conversely, a nonsingular curve of the form (1) – or (2) if thecharacteristic is greater than5 –
defines an elliptic curve. For (2) the non-singularity assumption is equivalent to4A3+27B2 6= 0.
Most of the interest for elliptic curves stems from the fact that they come with a natural group
structure. A composition law(P, Q) 7→ P + Q overE(K) can be constructed as follows:
• The neuter element is the point at infinity;
• Let (PQ) be the line throughP andQ (the tangent to the curve atP if P = Q).
• Let R be the third point of intersection of(PQ) andK.
• The pointP + Q is the symmetrical ofR with respect to the liney = 0.
An alternative way of seeing the composition law is that three aligned points add up to zero,
which is the point at infinity.
Theorem 1 (E(K), +) is a group.
The only difficult part is associativity. Classically, there are two roads for proving this. The
“low road” uses either computer algebra (the one that we shall carefully take later on) or ele-
mentary but subtle geometric considerations. The “high road” instead defines a group by taking
the quotient of the free abelian group overE(K) by a subgroup of relations (generated by the
relations “three aligned points add up to zero”), and proceeds to prove that each class contains
one and only one representative consisting of a single point(so hat the underlying set is in bi-
jection withE(K)) and that the operation is the same as+. All these are consequences of the
(non-trivial) Riemann-Roch Theorem.
In our formalisation, we start from (2). We take an arbitraryfield K of characteristic other
than2 (this is the only assumption that is needed to prove the groupstr cture) and two elements
A andB such that4A3 + 27B2 6= 0. The typeelt that represents the elements of the curve is
defined as follows
Inductive elt: Set :=
inf_elt: elt
| curve_elt (x: K) (y: K) (H: y^2 = x^3 + A * x + B): elt.
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An element of typeelt is either 0 (inf_elt) or an element of the curve (curve_elt) that
contains anx, ay and a proofH that the point(x, y) is on the curve.
For the operations on the curve, we need to define the oppositeand the addition. Given a
pointp of the curve, we define−p as
- If p = 0 then−p = 0
- If p = (x, y) then−p = (x,−y)
Given two pointsp1 andp2 on the curve, we definep1 + p2 as
- If p1 = 0 thenp1 + p2 = p2
- If p2 = 0 thenp1 + p2 = p1
- If p1 = −p2 thenp1 + p2 = 0
- If p1 = p2 = (x, y) andy 6= 0 then
let l = (3x2 + A)/2y andx1 = l2 − 2x in
p1 + p2 = (x1,−y − l(x1 − x)).
- If p1 = (x1, y1) andp2 = (x2, y2) andx1 6= x2 then
let l = (y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1) andx3 = l2 − x1 − x2 in
p1 + p2 = (x3,−y1 − l(x3 − x1)).
We also usep1 −p2 as a shortcut forp1 +(−p2). Note that, as points of the curve contain a proof
that they belong to the curve, the definition of these operations must also incorporate a proof that
these operations are internal. For example, the opposite isrepresented by a functionopp whose
type iselt → elt and its definition is
Definition opp p :=
match p with
inf_elt => inf_elt
| curve_elt x y H => curve_elt x (-y) opp_lem
end.
whereopp_lem represents the proof that if we know thaty2 = x3 + Ax + B (this isH) then we
have(−y)2 = x3 + Ax + B.
We get that0 is the neuter element,−p is the opposite ofp, and the addition is commutative
directly from the definitions. Proving associativity is rather technical. A detailed description of
the formal proof is given in [23]. Here, we only sketch the proof and discuss the most interesting
issues.
As the definition of addition contains five cases, the proof heavily relies on case analysis. The
additionp1 + p2 is trivial if p1 = 0 or p2 = 0 or p1 = −p2. When the addition is non-trivial we
RR n° 6155
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x1 − x2 6= 0 ∧
x4 − x3 6= 0 ∧
x2 − x3 6= 0 ∧
x5 − x1 6= 0 ∧
y2
1
= x3
1
+ Ax1 + B ∧
y2
2
= x3
2
+ Ax2 + B ∧
y2
3
= x3
3
+ Ax3 + B ∧
x4 = (y1 − y2)2/(x1 − x2)2 − x1 − x2 ∧
y4 = −(y1 − y2)/(x1 − x2)(x4 − x1) − y1 ∧
x6 = (y4 − y3)2/(x4 − x3)2 − x4 − x3 ∧
y6 = −(y4 − y3)/(x4 − x3)(x6 − x3) − y3 ∧
x5 = (y2 − y3)2/(x2 − x3)2 − x2 − x3 ∧
y5 = −(y2 − y3)/(x2 − x3)(x5 − x2) − y2 ∧
x7 = (y5 − y1)2/(x5 − x1)2 − x5 − x1 ∧
y7 = −(y5 − y1)/(x5 − x1)(x7 − x1) − y1
⇒ x6 − x7 = 0
where
(x4, y4) = p1 ⊕g p2, (x5, y5) = p2 ⊕g p3,
(x6, y6) = (p1 ⊕g p2) ⊕g p3 and(x7, y7) = p1 ⊕g (p2 ⊕g p3)
Figure 1: Condition for thex component of the first case.
use the notationp1⊕p2. In turn, this addition can correspond to the tangent case,p1⊕t p2, where
p1 = p2 or the general case,p1 ⊕g p2, wherep1 6= p2. For associativity, it is easy to discharge the
trivial cases and what remains to be proved is then thatp1 ⊕ (p2 ⊕ p3) = (p1 ⊕ p2)⊕ p3. Each of
these additions can be tangent or general, this can be further reduced to four main cases:
1. p1 ⊕g (p2 ⊕g p3) = (p1 ⊕g p2) ⊕g p3.
2. p1 ⊕g (p2 ⊕t p2) = (p1 ⊕g p2) ⊕g p2.
3. p1 ⊕g (p1 ⊕g (p1 ⊕t p1)) = (p1 ⊕t p1) ⊕t (p1 ⊕t p1)
4. p1 ⊕g (p2 ⊕g (p1 ⊕g p2)) = (p1 ⊕g p2) ⊕t (p1 ⊕g p2)
The first three cases are discharged using explicit computations while the last case is derived
using auxiliary properties such as the cancellation law, i.e. if p + p1 = p + p2 thenp1 = p2. To
understand what it means to perform cases1÷3 by explicit computations, let us consider the first
case. If we take thex component of equation 1 and unfold the definition of addition, we get the
conditional equation to be satisfied given in Figure 1. We cannow transform this equation into
a polynomial one and then use Buchberger algorithm [3] to check that the equation is satisfied.
This is where the computer algebra system comes into play. Integrating Buchberger algorithm in
INRIA
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a safe way inside a prover is possible and has already been done [6, 13], but cases1 ÷ 3 can be
decided by a much simpler strategy. To illustrate this strategy, let us consider a more elementary
example, i.e. the proof that the addition is internal in the tangent case. It amounts to proving that
y2 = x3 + Ax + B ∧
l = (3x2 + A)/2y ∧
x1 = l
2 − 2x ∧
y1 = −y − l(x1 − x) ∧
⇒ y2
1
= x3
1
+ Ax1 + B
The first step is to get rid of division by normalising the equation into an expression of the form
N/D = 0 whereN andD are two polynomial expressions. We are then left with proving that
N = 0. In our example, a naive normalisation gives
210y8 − 210y6x3 − 210Ay6x − 210By6 = 0
The second step is to replace all the occurrences ofy2 by x3 + Ax + B.
210(x3+Ax+B)4−210(x3+Ax+B)3x3−210A(x3+Ax+B)3x−210B(x3+Ax+B)3 = 0
The final step is to use distributivity, associativity, commutativity and collect equal monomials
so that everything cancels out.
Note that even a dedicated computer algebra system like Maple may fail, by using the general
Gröbner machinery, to prove such a large identity. The remedy, like here, is to perform “by hand”
the reductions modulo the ideal< y2
1
−x3
1
−Ax1−B, y22−x32−Ax2−B >, by using the fact that
the basis given for this ideal is already a Gröbner basis for the lex orderingy1 > y2 > x1 > x2.
To sum up, three ingredients are needed to automate the proofof the three lemmas corre-
sponding to cases1 ÷ 3: a procedure to normalise polynomial expressions (last step), a pro-
cedure to rewrite polynomial expressions (second step) anda procedure to normalise rational
expressions (first step).
The procedure to normalise polynomial expressions was already present in COQ and is de-
scribed in [11]. Its main characteristic is to use an internal epresentation of polynomials in
Horner form. This representation is unique up to variable ordering. Given a polynomialP and a
variablex, we writeP asP1 + xiQ1 wherex does not occur inP1 and is not a common factor
in Q1 and we proceed onP1 andQ1 recursively. The normal form is further simplified writing0
for m0 andP for 0 + P andP + 0. For example
210y8 − 210y6x3 − 210Ay6x − 210By6
is represented as
y6((B(−210) + x(A(−210) + x2(−210))) + y2210)
for the orderingy > x > A > B. Once the procedures to add and multiply polynomials in
Horner form have been defined, the normal form of a polynomialP is obtained by a simple
structural traversal ofP . As described in [11], this leads to a very effective way of proving ring
equalities by just checking that the normal form of the left side of the equality is structurally
equal to the normal form of the right side of the equality.
RR n° 6155
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Rewriting has been implemented in a naive way on Horner repres ntation. It uses a simple
procedure that, given a monomialm, splits a polynomialP in a pair(P1, Q1) in such a way that
P = P1 + mQ1. Now rewriting once with the equationm = R is performed by building the
polynomialP1 + RQ1. For example, if we want to rewrite the previous polynomial with the
equationy2x2 = z + t, we first split the polynomial
y6((B(−210) + x(A(−210) + x2(−210))) + y2210)
into
( y6((B(−210) + x(A(−210))) + y2210) , y4x(−210) )
We then build
(y6((B(−210) + x(A(−210))) + y2210)) + (z + t) (y4x(−210))
and normalise it. For rewriting with respect to a list of equations, we just iterate the single
rewriting operation for all the equations in a fair way. Notethat in our specific case we are
always rewriting with equations of the typey2i = x
3
i + Axi + B, so we take a special care in
choosing a variable ordering for the Horner representationsuch that theyi are privileged. By
doing so, the splitting procedure has only to visit a small part of the polynomial.
Normalising rational equalities is not as simple as for polyn mial expressions. When reduc-
ing the initial expression to a common denominator, the exprssions for the numerator and the
denominator can grow very quickly. Our experiments with theproofs of cases1÷ 3 have shown
that getting a normalised numerator of a reasonable size wasmandatory in order to be able to
complete the following rewriting phase. So, when normalising, some reductions are needed. For
example, when normalisingP1/Q1 +P2/Q2 we can do much better than building the naive frac-
tion (P1Q2 + P2Q1)/Q1Q2. Unfortunately, gcd algorithms for multivariate polynomials are far
more complex to implement than the simple Euclidean algorithm for univariate polynomials. So,
we have just implemented a syntactic heuristic. Our heuristic factorises the products that are in
common betweenQ1 andQ2 by a simple structural traversal of the lists of products that compose
Q1 andQ2. For example, normalising1/x + 1/xy + 1/y = 0 givesy + 1 + x = 0.
The three procedures (polynomial normaliser, rewriter andrational normaliser) are put to-
gether in a single tacticfield. This tactic works on arbitrary field structures. GivenF a
rational expression, calling the tacticfield[H1 H2] attempts to solve the goalF = 0 using
the rewriting rulesH1 andH2. The three procedures have been defined inside the COQ logic
using the two-level approach [1]. Their correctness can thebe stated inside the proof system
and formally proved. This ensures once and for all applications that thefield tactic only per-
forms valid simplifications. A key aspect of this tactic is itefficiency. Proving the group law
requires non-trivial computation. Having a relatively efficient procedure is mandatory to be able
to complete the proof. On an Intel Xeon (2.66 GHz) with 2Gb of RAM, compiling the definition
of elliptic curves up to associativity takes one minute and twenty seconds in COQ.
INRIA
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3 Prime certificate
The group structure onE(Z/pZ) is used in the same way as the group structure on(Z/pZ)∗ is
used in Pocklington’sp − 1 test, which we recall:
Proposition 1 (Pocklington) LetN be an integer. Assume that there existsa coprime toN and
s such that
• as = 1 mod N ;
• for all prime divisorp of s, one hasgcd(as/p − 1, N) = 1.
Then, for any primeq|N , one hasq = 1 mod s, so that ifs ≥
√
N , N is prime.
The main drawback of Pocklington’s test is the fact that if one is not able to factorN − 1
to some extent (a little thought shows that the first condition implies, if N is actually prime,
s|N − 1, since the conditions stated imply thats is the order ofa mod N), then there is no way
one can apply the theorem.
The following theorem is thus much more versatile, the main point being that, under rea-
sonable conjectures, we are always able to find, in polynomial time, a curve overZ/NZ with
cardinality which can be factored.
We make use of points in projective coordinates, which is requir d to give a meaningful
statement. This allows to give formulas without division for the group law, which thus remain
meaningful in any ring – sinceZ/NZ can be assumed to be a field only afterN has been proved
prime...
Proposition 2 (Goldwasser-Kilian) Let N be an integer. Assume that there exist an elliptic
curvey2 = x3 +Ax+B with A, B ∈ Z andgcd(4A3 +27B2, N) = 1, a pointP = (xP : yP : 1)
such thaty2P = x
3
P + AxP + B mod N , and an integers such that
• s.P = (0 : 1 : 0) mod N ;
• for all primep|s, (s/p).P = (xp : yp : zp) mod N with gcd(zp, N) = 1.
Then, for all primeq|N , we have the number of points ofE(Z/qZ) is such that#E(Z/qZ) =
0 mod s.
In view of the Hasse-Weil bound [21], which states that for all prime q and elliptic curveE
overZ/qZ, one has#E(Z/qZ) ≤ (√q + 1)2, we see thatN is prime as soon ass > √q + 1. In
the sequel, we shall use the slightly weaker but much easier bound#E(Z/qZ) ≤ 2q + 1, which
shows thatN is prime as soon ass >
√
2q + 1.
An elliptic curve certificate is thus defined recursively by:
CN := (N, A, B, xP , yP , s, (q1, Cq1), . . . , (qk, Cqk)),
where theqi are the prime factors ofs, and checking the certificate amounts to checking the
hypotheses of the theorem, hence modular arithmetic.
RR n° 6155
10 L. Théry and G. Hanrot
Computing a certificate is a much harder problem. The most effici nt way is to use the
theory of complex multiplication, after Atkin and Morain. For a more extensive bibliography,
the interested reader can refer to the nice survey of primality proving by Morain [19].
The idea behind the formal proof of Proposition 2 is to relatecomputations with projective
coordinates done inZ/NZ with the same computations with standard coordinates done in Z/qZ
whenq is a prime divisor ofN . We use a non-standard definition of projective coordinateswhere
we still single out the zero. A point is either0 or a triplet (x : y : z). We also define the
projectiontq astq(0) = 0 andtq((x : y : z)) = (xmod q/z mod q, y mod q/z mod q). Note that
the projection in the second case is possible only ifz mod q has effectively an inverse inZ/qZ
for prime divisorq of N , so only ifgcd(n,N ) = 1 . In the following, we write the property ofn
having an inverse asinvN (n).
We have to be careful when computing inZ/NZ since we want the computation inZ/NZ
to project faithfully to the same computation inZ/qZ. Suppose that we test to zero a variablen.
Obviously if we haven = 0, we also haven mod q = 0, but the converse may not be true:n 6= 0
does not imply thatn mod q 6= 0. So every time we have a test to zero on a variablen, we have
to check the extra condition thatinvN (n) to ensure that the computation onZ/qZ would take
the same branch. For this reason, all the functions that we hav defined forZ/NZ take an extra
argument that represents the side conditions so far and return a pair composed of the result plus
the new side conditions. We encode all the side conditions ina si gle number using the property
thatinvN(mn) impliesinvN(m) andinvN (n).
A result (p1, sc1) of a computation can be correctly interpreted only if we haveinvN (sc1)
whenp1 = 0 or invN (z1sc1) whenp1 = (x1 : y1 : z1). In the following, we use the notation
⌈p1, sc1⌉ to indicate that this property holds. To give a concrete example, consider the function
doublethat doubles a pointp1 under the initial side conditionsc1. Its definition is
double(p1, sc1) =
if p1 = 0 then(0, sc1) else
let (x1 : y1 : z1) = p1 in
if y1 = 0 then(0, z1sc1) else
let m = 3x2
1
+ Az2
1
andl = 2y1z1 in
let l2 = l2 andx2 = m2z1 − 2x1l2 in
((x2l : l2(x1m − y1l) − x2m : z1l2l), sc1)
and its correctness is stated as
∀p1 sc1 p2 sc2, let (p2, sc2) = double(p1, sc1) in ⌈p2, sc2⌉ ⇒ tq(p2) = 2.tq(p1)
Another key property is that the final side condition includes the initial one
∀p1 sc1 p2 sc2, let(p2, sc2) = double(p1, sc1) in ⌈p2, sc2⌉ ⇒ ⌈p1, sc1⌉
INRIA
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Knowing that these two properties must hold, we can now explain how the side conditions have
been generated in the body of the functiondouble. Whenp1 is zero, no condition has to be added.
Whenp1 is (x1 : 0 : z1), the result is zero so we include the final side condition thatz1 must be
invertible. Finally, whenp1 is (x1 : y1 : z1) with y1 6= 0, a defensive final side conditions would
bey1z1sc1 to insure thaty1 andz1 are invertible but this is not necessary since if we look at the
z component,z1l2l, of the resulting point, that contains already the producty1z1.
The functionadd that adds two points is defined in a similar way. With the two functions
doubleandadd, we can define the functionscal that addsn times the pointp1 under the side
conditionsc1:
scal(n, p1, sc1) =
if n = 1 then(p1, sc1) else
if n is even then let(p2, sc2) = double(p1, sc1) in scal(n/2, p2, sc2) else
let (p2, sc2) = double(p1, sc1) in
let (p3, sc3) = scal((n − 1)/2, p2, sc2) in
add(p1, p3, sc3)
and its correctness is stated as
∀n p1 sc1, p2 sc2, let (p2, sc2) = scal(n, p1sc1) in ⌈p2, sc2⌉ ⇒ tp(p2) = n.tp(p1)
Given a listl = [(q1, α1), . . . , (qn, αn)] such thats = q
α1
1
. . . qαnn , checking thats.a = 0 and
(s/qi).a 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is done by factorising computations as much as possible. We first
computep1 = (s/(q1 . . . qn)).a. The functionscalL that, given a pointp1 and a listl such that
l = [q1, . . . , qn] and a side conditionsc1, verifies that(q1 . . . qn).p1 = 0 and(q1 . . . qn/qi).p1 6= 0
for everyqi is defined as follows
scalL(l, p1, sc1) =
if length(l) = 0 then(p1, sc1) else
let (p2, sc2) = scal(hd(l), p1, sc1) in
let (p3, sc3) = scal_list(tl(l), p1, sc2) in
if p3 = 0 then(0, 0) else
let (x3, y3, z3) = p3 in scalL(tl(l), p2, z3sc3)
where the functionshd andtl return the head element and the tail of a list respectively and the
function scal_listapplied tol andp1, wherel = [qi, . . . , qn], computes(qi . . . qn).p1. In every
recursive call of the functionscalL, p3 represents one of the(q1 . . . qn/qi).p1. If p3 is 0, we put
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0 in the side condition in order to invalidate the final result.If p3 is not0, tp(p3) must also be
non-zero so we add itsz component into the side condition.
The actual representation of COQ certificates is a list of elementary certificates rather thana
tree. This list must be well-founded in the sense that the primality of a number that is needed
by an elementary certificate at positioni is justified by another certificate at positionj > i.
An elementary certificate is either an immediate certificate, Pocklington certificate or an el-
liptic certificate. An immediate certificate is for numbers whose primality is given by a pre-
defined theorem. In our library there are predefined theoremsfor the first 5000 prime num-
bers. Our elliptic certificates slightly differ from the standard ones to accommodate the certifi-
cates produced by the tool PRIMO [17]. An elliptic certificate is composed of seven elements:
{N, A, B, x1, y1, n0, [(q1, α1), . . . , (qn, αn)]}:
- N is the number to be proved prime;
- A andB are the parameters of the elliptic curvey2 = x3 + Ax + B;
- x1 andy1 are the coordinates of the initial point, in projective coordinates the initial point
is p0 = (x1 : y1 : 1);
- n0 is an initial scalar, so the point whose order is checked isn0.p0.
- [(q1, α1), . . . , (qn, αn)] is a complete factorisation of the orders of n0.p0, i.e. s = q
α1
1
. . . qαnn
where all theqi are prime.
An example of such a certificate is
{
329719147332060395689499,
−94080,
9834496,
0,
3136,
8209062,
[(40165264598163841, 1)]
}
It allows to assess the primality of329719147332060395689499knowing that40165264598163841
is prime with the curvey2 = x3 − 94080x + 9834496 and the point8209062.(0, 3136) whose
order is 40165264598163841.
The functiontestCertifthat checks an elliptic certificatec is defined as follows:
testCertif (c) =
let (N, A, B, x1, y1, n, l) = c in
let p0 = (x1, y1, 1) in
let sc0 = 4A3 + 27B2 in
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let (p1, sc1) = scal(n, p0, sc0) in
let s = mull(l) in
let (n′, l′) = split(l) in
let (p2, sc2) = scal(n′, p1, sc1) in
let (p3, sc3) = scalL(l′, p2, sc2) in
if N > 1 andodd(N) and4N < (s − 1)2 and
y2
1
mod N = (x3
1
+ Ax1 + B) mod N and
p3 = 0 andgcd(sc3, N) = 1
thentrueelsefalse
where, if l = [(q1, α1), . . . , (qn, αn)], the functionmull applied tol returnsq
α1
1
. . . qαnn and the
functionsplit applied tol returns(qα1−1
1
. . . qαn−1n , [q1, . . . , qn]). The correctness of the function
testCertifis stated as
∀c, (testCertif (c) = true ∧ (∀q α, (q, α) ∈ getL(c) ⇒ prime(q))) ⇒ prime(getN (c))
wheregetNandgetLare the accessor functions for the first component and the last component
of the certificate respectively.
Proving the correctness of the functiontestCertifis straightforward. It is standard program
verification. Getting the side conditions right was the onlytricky part. Note that it would be very
difficult to detect a missing side condition just by testing.The program only returns a boolean
value and it is mainly applied to certificates for which a positive answer is expected. Missing
a side condition never invalidates valid certificates. Compared to standard checkers, we had to
compromise with the bound on the orders of an element overZ/qZ. We use the naive bound
4N < (s − 1)2 that is easy to establish. Standard checkers use the sharperHasse-Weil bound.
Getting this bound formally is a challenge on its own.
4 Some benchmarks
Figure 2 shows some benchmarks on prime numbers from 25 to 250decimal digits. These
benchmarks have been done on a processor Intel Xeon (2.66 GHz) with 2Gb of RAM. For each
number length, there are nine examples. We generate theith example of lengthn by starting with
the digit i and repetitively incrementing the previous digit by 1 modulo 10 to get the next digit.
Once we haven digits, we just take the first prime number above this number.Fo example, the
nine prime numbers with 25 digits are:
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25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
n − 1 1 0 4 2 3 5 5 2 6 7
1 ell 1 4 8 13 14 17 20 26 28 28
time 0.2 8 36 105 297 523 865 1570 2353 3018
n − 1 0 5 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 6
2 ell 2 1 7 10 19 21 24 24 27 35
time 0.9 4 26 105 333 569 1007 1704 2462 3573
n − 1 2 0 1 4 4 1∗ 4 3 5 7
3 ell 2 1 7 10 19 20∗ 24 25 27 35
time 0.1 11 42 132 288 513∗ 1277 1774 2477 2960
n − 1 2 3 4 0 4 6 3 3 7 5
4 ell 2 4 7 12 12 9 22 27 30 40
time 1.1 11 49 130 257 339 948 1754 2275 4688
n − 1 1 3 3 5 3 5 8 3 4 3
5 ell 1 2 6 9 11 20 20 29 33 37
time 0.7 3 36 143 264 514 1092 1859 2882 4090
n − 1 1 2 4 2∗ 4 2 7 4 2 1
6 ell 0 3 8 12∗ 14 19 21 22 34 33
time 0.1 6 39 187∗ 223 479 977 1317 2811 3727
n − 1 0 1 5 2 1 2 4 5 7 3
7 ell 2 4 10 14 16 19 27 27 28 34
time 0.8 11 54 148 329 453 1259 1514 2498 3327
n − 1 2 2 3 7 4 5 2 7 2 1
8 ell 0 4 7 6 17 20 28 31 34 40
time 0.1 6 44 91 310 489 1442 2252 2817 3721
n − 1 2 2 3 5 7 4 5 7 5 5
9 ell 1 4 10 13 9 20 27 26 29 33
time 0.4 7 46 139 194 549 1229 2061 2509 3645
Figure 2: Some benchmarks for numbers from 25 to 250 digits.
1234567890123456789012353, 2345678901234567890123567,
3456789012345678901234573, 4567890123456789012345689,
5678901234567890123456797, 6789012345678901234567903,
7890123456789012345678973, 8901234567890123456789017,
9012345678901234567890149
To generate certificates, we automatically convert the onesproduced by the program PRIMO.
For each example, we give the number of Pocklington certificaes nd elliptic certificates that
compose the overall certificate and the time in seconds that COQ needs to verify the certificate.
Out of the 1538 elliptic certificates only two could not be proved inside COQ. They are indicated
by a star in Figure 2. This comes from the fact that our condition 4N < (s − 1)2 is stronger
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than the usual bound given by Hasse Theorem. The two certificates that fail were forN =
896191029759386718510467381341,s = 1501356318335977 andN = 13524493647665641984723,
s = 95147824089 respectively. Since in each case the value ofN is relatively small, we could
replace the elliptic certificate with an alternative Pocklington certificate. Note that this should
happen only for quite small values ofN , so that the corresponding parts of the certificate can
always be replaced by Pocklington certificates. Another strategy, if one has access to the code
looking for the certificates, is to modify it very slightly tomake it generate only certificates that
can be checked using the modified Hasse bound (which, somehow, corresponds to making the
search for certificates “less aggressive” and content itself with certificates of “lesser quality”).
All the examples and the code are available at
http://coqprime.gforge.inria.fr/
They compile with the current version 8.1 of the COQ system. The time to check a certificate
grows quickly with the number of digits, for example we need one hour to check a number with
250 decimal digits. Note that the theory predicts that the worst-case complexity for checking a
certificate forN with an underlying quadratic multiprecision arithmetic isO((log N)4), which
more or less corresponds to what we observe. Note also that itwould be easy to gain a small
constant factor in the current implementation by optimizing our functionscal, eg. by using
sliding window methods and/or addition-substraction chains.
In order to be able to check larger numbers, we would need two main improvements in the
COQ system. First, all our computations are done inside COQ with user-defined data-structures,
i.e. we use the modular arithmetic defined in [10] based on a dat type composed of 256 con-
structors that simulates an 8-bit arithmetic. We would needa direct access to the machine 32-bit
arithmetic instead. In [10], some tests for Pocklington certificates with a native 32-bits arithmetic
exhibit a speed-up of 80. Such speed-up would make it possible, in our case, to verify a 250-digit
number in less than a minute. We have also experienced with extracting our code to OCAML [16]
and linking it with the arbitrary-precision integer library BIGNUM [20]. We got in this case an
even bigger speed-up since checking one of our 250-digit numbers only takes 0.2 second and we
were capable to check in 36 seconds the millennium prime, a prime with 2000 decimal digits
whose certificate generated by PRIMO contains 245 elliptic certificates and 8 Pocklington ones.
Second, we are in a purely functional setting and a large amount f time is thus spent in
allocating memory for new numbers. Computations should useconstant memory to be really
efficient. For this, we would need COQ to accommodate destructive datastructures as proposed
for ACL2 in [2] with a monadic approach.
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Buchberger algorithm. Bruno Barras and Benjamin Grégoire helped us with their expertise in in-
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6 Conclusion
We believe that what is presented in this paper is a very nice illustration of a key aspect of
formal verification. Defining prime numbers from scratch is very simple in a proof assistant. It
is done with five definitions in COQ: one for the natural numbers, one for the addition, one for
the multiplication, one for the divisibility and finally onefor the primality. All these definitions
are straightforward, so it is easy to get convinced that the notio of primality has been correctly
captured in the proof system. Then, the fact that there exists a formal proof for each of the
numbers of Figure 2 ensures that the primality of these numbers follows logically from these five
definitions. For the actual proofs, we are free to use any elaborate devices like in our case elliptic
certificates. Of course, this is true only if the proof systemis sound. It is then crucial to keep
the trusted base of the prover as small as possible. This is what e have done here, reflecting the
symbolic manipulations and internally checking the prime certificates generated by PRIMO.
Another aspect that this example illustrates is how important is for a proof system not only
to reason right but also to compute right. Our initial attempts in proving cases1 ÷ 3 have
clearly indicated that we were on the fringe of what was actually possible to prove inside COQ:
the parser had problems to handle the huge terms we were generating and using the standard
rewriting tactic of COQ was generating titanic proof terms. Reflecting symbolic manipulation
was the key point that made everything possible. All we have developed was generic enough
to be integrated into the COQ system. Nevertheless, a way to look at what we have done is to
consider that we have just been reflecting a specific rewriting strategy. It would be interesting to
investigate how we could reflect a generic rewriting strategy instead and get back our symbolic
manipulation by simple instantiation.
Finally, the initial motivation that has lead to this work was to see how far we could go in
proving primality inside a proof system. With elliptic certificates, we have reached the current
state of the art. We can now prove the primality of any number with less than 300 decimal digits.
We believe that, with the future improvement of numerical evaluation inside COQ, this limit will
quickly increase. Anyway, the infrastructure is there. In particular, this is, to our knowledge, the
first time that associativity has been formally proved inside a proof system. We hope that this
initial effort will motivate deeper mathematical formalisations with elliptic curves inside proof
systems.
References
[1] Samuel Boutin. Using Reflection to Build Efficient and Certified Decision Procedures. In
TACS’97, volume 1281 ofLNCS, pages 515–529, Sendai, Japan, 1997.
INRIA
Primality Proving with Elliptic Curves 17
[2] Robert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore. Single-threaded objects in ACL2. InPADL’2001,
volume 2257, pages 9–27, 2001.
[3] Bruno Buchberger. Introduction to Gröbner Bases. In Bruno Buchberger and Franz Win-
kler, editors,Gröbner Bases and Applications, pages 3–31. Cambridge University Press,
1998.
[4] Antonio Capani, Gianfranco Niesi, and Lorenzo Robbiano. C coa: Computations in com-
mutative algebra. Available ath tp://cocoa.dima.unige.it/.
[5] Henri Cohen and Gerhard Frey.Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy. Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications. Chapman & Hall/ CRC, 2005.
[6] Jérôme Créci and Loïc Pottier. Gb: une procédure de décision pour le système Coq. In
JFLA’2004, pages 83–90, 2004.
[7] Stefan Friedl. An elementary proof of the group law for elliptic curves. Excerpt from
undergraduate thesis, Regensburg (1998), available at
http://www.labmath.uqam.ca/~friedl/papers/AAELLIPTIC.PDF.
[8] Shafi Goldwasser and Joe Kilian. Almost all primes can be quickly certified. InProceedings
of the 18th STOC, pages 316–329, 1986.
[9] Benjamin Grégoire and Laurent Théry. A Purely Functional Library for Modular Arith-
metic and its Application to Certifying Large Prime Numbers. In IJCAR, volume 4130 of
LNCS, pages 423–437, 2006.
[10] Benjamin Grégoire, Laurent Théry, and Benjamin Werner. A Computational Approach to
Pocklington Certificates in Type Theory. InFLOPS, volume 3945 ofLNCS, pages 97–113,
2006.
[11] Benjamin Grégoire and Assia Mahboubi. Proving ring equalities done right in Coq. In
TPHOLS’05, volume 3603 ofLNCS, pages 98–113.
[12] John Harrison. HOL light: A tutorial introduction. InFMCAD’96, volume 1166, pages
265–269, 1996.
[13] John Harrison. Complex quantifier elimination in HOL. In TPHOLs 2001: Supplemental
Proceedings, pages 159–174. University of Edinburgh, 2001.
[14] Joe Hurd. Formalized elliptic curve cryptography. Available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jeh1004/research/talks/
elliptic-talk.pdf.
[15] Hendrik W. Lenstra Jr. Factoring integers with elliptic curves.Ann. Math., 126:649–673,
1987.
RR n° 6155
18 L. Théry and G. Hanrot
[16] Xavier Leroy. Objective Caml. Available ath tp://pauillac.inria.fr/ocaml/,
1997.
[17] Marcel Martin. PRIMO - primality proving. Available at
http://www.ellipsa.net/.
[18] François Morain. Certificate for(((((((((23 + 3)3 + 30)3 + 6)3 + 80)3 + 12)3 + 450)3 +
894)3 + 3636)3 + 70756)3 + 97220. Available at
http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/Labo/Francois.Morain.
[19] François Morain. La primalité en temps polynomial, d’après Adleman, Huang ; Agrawal,
Kayal, Saxena.Séminaire Bourbaki, 3(55), 2002.
[20] Valérie Ménissier-Morain. The CAML Numbers ReferenceManual. Technical Report 141,
INRIA, 1992.
[21] Joseph H. Silverman.The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves. Springer Verlag, 1986.
[22] The COQ development team. The Coq Proof Assistant Referenc Manual v7.2. Technical
Report 255, INRIA, 2002. Available ath tp://coq.inria.fr/doc.
[23] Laurent Théry. Proving the group law for elliptic curves formally. Technical Report 330,
INRIA, 2007.
INRIA
Unité de recherche INRIA Sophia Antipolis
2004, route des Lucioles - BP 93 - 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Futurs : Parc Club Orsay Université- ZAC des Vignes
4, rue Jacques Monod - 91893 ORSAY Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Lorraine : LORIA, Technopôle de Nancy-Brabois - Campus scientifique
615, rue du Jardin Botanique - BP 101 - 54602 Villers-lès-Nancy Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rennes : IRISA, Campus universitaie de Beaulieu - 35042 Rennes Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rhône-Alpes : 655, avenue de l’Europe - 38334 Montbonnot Saint-Ismier (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rocquencourt : Domaine de Voluceau- Rocquencourt - BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex (France)
Éditeur
INRIA - Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt, BP 105 - 78153 Le Ch snay Cedex (France)
http://www.inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
